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NOTES
Municipal Control of Liquor In Ohio
Do Ohio municipalities have the power to control the consumption

of and the traffic in intoxicating liquor within their territorial limits?
Consider the recent experience of the City of Lakewood in attempting to
exercise some measure of control over the location of a retail liquor outlet. The city passed an ordinance prohibiting the operation of such a
business within 800 feet of a school, church, library or public playground.' Contrary to this, a permit holder began selling intoxicating
liquor at a location situated approximately 650 feet from one of the
above named premises, and the city promptly cited her for violating the
ordinance. The permit holder then sought and was granted an injunction to restrain the enforcement of the ordinance,' and the injunction was
upheld on appeal There was no finding that the City of Lakewood
could not legislate on the subject of intoxicating liquor. The basis for
holding the ordinance invalid was that it was in conflict with a general
state law on the same subject.4 The statute in question was nearly identical with the ordinance, with the exception that it provided for a minimum
of 500 feet rather than 800 feet.5 To one unacquainted with the history
of liquor control in Ohio and who knows only that Ohio is a "home rule
state,"' such a result may seem rather surprising. To the initiated, however, probably the only surprising thing is that Lakewood even attempted
to exercise its constitutional home-rule power on this subject and in this
manner.
In order to understand why this situation exists for Ohio municipalities, it is appropriate to consider briefly the basis for governmental control over intoxicating liquor and the application of that control within
1. Lakewood Ohio, Ordinance 97-56, Dec. 18, 1956, which provides: "That the location of
such use shall not be within 800 feet of the boundary of a parcel of real estate having situated
thereon a school, church, library or public park or playground."
2. Gozion v. City of Lakewood, Civil No. 717, 374, C.P., Cuyahoga County, Ohio, Feb. 20,
1959.
3. Gozion v. City of Lakewood, Civil No. 24, 885, Ct. App., Ohio, Dec. 18, 1959.
4. Gozion v. City of Lakewood, Civil No. 717, 374, C.P., Cuyahoga County, Ohio, Feb. 20,
1959.
5. Omo REV. CODE § 4303.26, which provides in part that: 'o permit shall be issued...
if the business ...

is to be operated within five hundred feet from the boundaries ...

of real

estate having situated thereon a school, church, library, or public playground until written
notice... has been personally served upon the authorities in control of said school, church,
library or public playground and an opportunity provided for a complete hearing upon the
advisability of the issuance of said permit ...."
6. The term generally means or refers to powers of local self-government conferred upon
municipalities by direct constitutional provision. 37 AM. JuR. Municipal Corporations 5 102
(1941).
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the State of Ohio. In conjunction therewith, the general and specific effectiveness of the home-rule provision of the Ohio constitution 7 must
also be examined.
Some control over the liquor industry is essential and has long been
accepted. At an early date it was said:
By the general concurrence of opinion of every civilized and christian community there are few sources of crime and misery to society
equal to the unregulated dramshop, where intoxicating liquor in small
quantities, to be drunk at the time are sold indiscriminately to all per-

sons applying. The statistics of every state show a greater amount of
crime and misery attributable to the use of ardent spirits at these retail
liquor saloons than to any other source. 8

To these sentiments, most present day policemen, social workers, psychologists, criminologists, and clergymen will undoubtedly say amen.
Who then shall exercise this necessary control and upon what legal
basis?
FEDERAL AND STATE CONTROL

Generally, the sale or dispensation of intoxicating liquor is controlled
through an exercise of the police power.' This concept is almost universally acknowledged. The federal government has powers in this area,
but only those which are connected or associated with one of the powers
expressly, or by necessary implication, granted to the federal government
and which do not invade the police power inherent in the states.'" It is
not necessary to consider what these federal powers are or how they are
used. The important thing is that the states retain all powers not expressly or impliedly given to the federal government. Ohio has, therefore, as a sovereign state, the power to limit and restrict by regulation
the manufacture, sale and importation of intoxicating liquor by the exercise of its police power." In order to enforce this power, the General
Assembly has enacted legislation establishing machinery to control the
liquor traffic.'
The General Assembly has created a Department of
Liquor Control, Board of Liquor Control and the position of Director of
Liquor Control. 3 The Board of Liquor Control is empowered to issue,
suspend, revoke and cancel permits and generally to adopt rules and regulations to carry out chapters 4301 and 4303 of the Revised Code.'4 The
7. Omo CoNsT. art. XVII, § 3.
8.
9.

10.
11.

Crowley v. Christensen, 137 U.S. 86, 91 (1890).
Kidd v. Pearson, 128 U.S. 1 (1888).

United States v. Constantine, 296 U.S. 287 (1935).
State ex rel. Zugravu v. O'Brien, 130 Ohio St. 23, 196 N.E. 664 (1935).

12. OHIO REv. CODE §§ 4301.01-.99, 4303.01-.99.
13.
14.

OHIo REV. CODE § 4301.02.
OHIO REV. CODE § 4301.03.
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state then, is well equipped with both the power and the organization to
control intoxicating liquor and the fact that it is authorized to do so is
undisputed. The only question which remains is whether the state and
federal governments are the only governmental bodies which have any
control over the liquor industry in Ohio.
SOURCE OF MUNICIPAL POWER

Inasmuch as the state has the primary right and duty through its
police power" to control intoxicating liquor, that police power must
somehow be passed on to the municipalities or they will be impotent.
This delegation may be accomplished by either a legislative or constitutional grant. 6 In Ohio and several other states, such a delegation of
police power has been attempted by constitutional provision." The common term applied to such provisions is "home rule" and, of course, it is
not limited to liquor control.
A comprehensive study of home rule generally or in Ohio specifically, is not appropriate here."8 However, a realization of the objectives of
the system is essential to understand the position of municipalities in regard to liquor control. An enumeration of a few arguments urged for
granting home rule to cities will suffice to show the theory behind such
provisions. The reasons most commonly advanced are, to:
(1) Obviate the evil of unwise legislative intermeddling with the
local affairs of municipalities;
(2) Foster and develop among the electors of the cities a sense of
responsibility and a knowledge of local affairs;
(3) Allow the electors with the best knowledge of local affairs to
legislate on such matters. 9
The first of these reasons is perhaps the paramount one. At any rate,
the purpose of home rule is dearly to allow municipalities to control
matters which affect their own unique problems. Since Ohio was not a
"home rule state" prior to 1912,20 it necessarily follows that the people
of Ohio had this result in mind when they approved Article XVIII of the
Ohio constitution. It cannot be over-emphasized that this delegation of
15. This power is reserved to the states by the tenth amendment. United States v. Lanza,
260 U.S. 377 (1922).
16. 30 AM. JUR. Intoxicating Liquor § 26 (1958).
17. OHIO CoNsT. art XVIII, § 3; CAL. CONST. art. XI, § 11; IDAHO CoNsT. art 12, § 2;
WASH. CONST. art 11, § 11.
18. For an excellent and extensive discussion of home rule in Ohio, see Blume, Municipal
Home Rule in Ohio: The New Look, 11 WEST. Ris. L. REv. 538 (1960).
19. 37 AM. Jtm. Municipal Corporations§ 102 (1941).
20. Prior to 1912, Ohio municipalities had only such powers as were conferred upon them
by the legislature. ELLIS, OHIo MUNICIPAL CODE § 1.1 (9th ed. 1955).
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power is incorporated in the constitution and can only be taken away by
constitutional amendment.2 '
Since the liquor traffic is controlled through the police power and
the police power of Ohio municipalities stems from the home-rule provision of the Ohio constitution, an examination of that provision is
necessary.
The Ohio constitution states:
Municipalities shall have authority to exercise all powers of local
self-government and to adopt and enforce within their limits such local
police, sanitary
22 and other similar regulations, as are not in conflict with
general laws.
This provision has generally been construed as making two separate
grants of power. The first is "all powers of local self government" and
the second is "local police, sanitary
and similar regulations as are not in
23
conflict with general laws.
The phrase "local self-government" has given courts considerable
trouble through the years. It is obviously too vague. The real problem
results from the use of the word "local," which implies that there are two
distinct classifications of governmental functions. Thus there would be,
on the one hand, purely local operations and on the other, purely state
operations. At least one authority feels that such a dassification is unrealistic.2 4 The weight of logic would seem to support that view considering the general purpose of the constitutional article. If it is held
that there must be something purely local in nature to allow the city to
act, home rule may well be dead for there is scarcely anything which is
purely local in nature.
An alternative construction is possible. It can be argued that there
are matters which are of either predominantly local or predominantly
state concern. It has been suggested that this construction substitutes
court rule for home rule.25 Whether such a substitution is undesirable
or not is immaterial. It may, in fact, be unavoidable regardless of the
wording. It is probably fanciful to believe that the provision can be so
worded as to avoid the necessity of interpretation.
The Ohio courts seem to have adopted the idea that there are matters
which are purely local in nature.2 6 This obviously gives rise to the neces21. OHIO CONST. art. II, § 1-a; art. XVI, § 1-3. In Akron v. Scalera, 135 Ohio St 65,
68, 19 N.E.2d 279, 280 (1939), Judge Matthias said, "This view, as we have seen, entirely
ignores the very essential fact that the powers of municipalities are now conferred by the constitution and not by the Legislature. Let it be clearly understood that the question here is not
one of policy but one of power."
22. OHIo CONST. art. XVIII, § 3.
23. State ex rel. Lynch v. Cleveland, 164 Ohio St. 437, 132 N.E.2d 118 (1956).
24. ELLIS, OHIO MUNICIPAL CODE § 1.22 (9th ed. 1955).
25. Ibid.
26.

State ex -rel.Bindas v. Andrish, 165 Ohio St. 441, 136 N.E.2d 43 (1956).
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sity for a determination of what matters are really purely local in nature.
For understandable reasons, there has been no definite criteria established." Although there have been a few attempts to establish a reasonable definition," the courts have been compelled to resort to a process of
judicial inclusion and exclusion. Short of a constitutional amendment
containing an enumeration of powers to be considered within the scope
of local self-government, the courts must inevitably continue on a case by
case basis. In any event, liquor control has never been held by the courts
to be a purely local matter. Nor has the legislature so considered it, as
can be seen by the elaborate machinery it has created at the state level
for liquor enforcement.
Therefore, the attempts by municipalities to control the liquor traffic
have been based on the second grant of power contained in section 3,
article XVIII. It states that municipalities may . . . adopt and enforce
within their limits such local police, sanitary and other similar regulations as are not in conflict with general laws."29 This grant of power has
been held to be limited by the phrase ". . . not in conflict with general
laws."3'
Perhaps if the article had been adopted as it was originally
proposed to the constitutional convention, the situation might not have
been so unfavorable to the cities as it is today. The original form of the
article was:
Municipalities shall have the power to enact and enforce within their
limits, such local police, sanitary and other similar regulations as are not
in conflict with general laws affecting the welfare of the state as a
whole; and no such regulations shall by reason of requirements therein,
in addition to those fixed by law, be deemed in conflict therewith, unless the general assembly, by general law, affecting the welfare of the
state as a whole, shall specifically deny all municipalities the right to act
thereon.3 1
Had the provision so limiting and defining general laws been retained it
seems logical to say that ordinances which are intended to confine liquor
sales to a particular area of a city, for example, would be purely local in
nature. Hence there would be no problem of conflict with general laws.
27. Chief Justice Weygandt has wisely pointed out that, ..... a power that clearly is one of
'local' self-government to one mind is clearly contrary to another.. ." State ex rel. Lynch v.

Cleveland, 164 Ohio St. 437, 438, 132 N.E.2d 118, 120 (1956). The Ohio Supreme Court
also has recognized the undesirability of being forced to make never ending decisions construing the constitutional provisions. State ex rel. Toledo v. Cooper, 97 Ohio St. 86, 119
NE. 253 (1917).

28. State ex re. Lynch v. Cleveland, 164 Ohio St. 437, 438, 132 N.E.2d 118, 120 (1956);
State ex rel. Arey v. Sherrill, 142 Ohio St. 574, 53 N.E.2d 501 (1944).
29.
30.

OHIO CONST. art. XVIII, § 3.
Fitzgerald v. City of Cleveland, 88 Ohio St. 338, 103 N.E. 512 (1913).

31.

PROCEEDiNGS AND DEBATES OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF THE STATE

OF OHIo 1439, 1441 (1913); see generally, Walker, Municipal Government in Ohio Before
1912, 9 Omo ST. L.J. 1, 22 (1948).
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Ironically, the reason this part of the proposed article was stricken was
an apparent fear by the "drys" that it would work to the best interests of
the liquor industry." The effect has been a weakening of home rule and
a resulting defeat for the cities who have tried to be more restrictive than
the state. To their credit, the proponents of retaining the clause seem to
have foreseen exactly the situation which has resulted.83 However, the
words were stricken, and today Ohio municipalities, if they desire to legislate on liquor, must avoid conflict with general laws. 4 When does such
conflict arise?
The leading case in Ohio on the problem of municipal conflict with
state laws is Village of Struthers v. Sokol.35 The test established in that
case was that conflict occurs when the ordinance permits or licenses that
which the statute prohibits, or when it prohibits that which the statute
permits.3" By implication, the court apparently meant to limit this rule
to instances where the state had expressly allowed or prohibited specific
acts. Other cases have held substantially the same and have reaffirmed
the idea that the statute must say something or there can be no conflict.3 "
The gist of the matter is that if the General Assembly does not specifically provide that act X is illegal (or legal), there is no possible way
in which an ordinance which states act X is legal (or illegal) can be in
conflict therewith.
However, the leading Ohio case concerning conflict between state and
municipal control of liquor has disregarded this general principle. Apparently the problem of conflict is not to be treated in the same way in
regard to liquor control as it is in regard to other subject matter. Significantly, no justification has been advanced for the distinction. In Neil
House Hotel Co. v. City of Columbus," the city had passed an ordinance
forbidding the sale of beer or intoxicating liquor after midnight. The
State Board of Liquor Control had stated that liquor could not be sold
between 2:30 a. m. and 5:30 a. m. The Supreme Court of Ohio, in a
four to three decision, held that the ordinance was in conflict with a general law and was therefore invalid. In so doing, the court adopted a
negative implication doctrine. They reasoned that since the general law
stated that operation after 2:30 a. m. was illegal, the law implied that
32.

PROCEEDINGS AND DEBATES OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF THE STATE

OF OHIO 1439 (1913).

33. Id. at 1464.
34. It can be said that general laws are those which operate uniformly throughout the state
applying to the people of the state generally. Note, 20 U. CIN. L. REV. 400 (1951).
35. 108 Ohio St. 263, 140 N.E. 519 (1923).
36. Id. at 268, 140 N.E. at 521; accord, City of Coshocton v. Saba, 55 Ohio App. 40, 8
N.E.2d 572 (1936).
37. City of Akron v. Scalera, 135 Ohio St. 65, 19 N.E.2d 279 (1939).
38. 144 Ohio St. 248, 58 N.E.2d 665 (1944).
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operation prior to that time was legal. Consequently, when the city
moved to cut the time for legal sales back to midnight, it was prohibiting
that which the state permitted. The decision ignores the obvious implication in Village of Struthers v. SokolP0 that the state must affirmatively
assert itself in order for a conflict to arise. At the very least one can say
that it would have been equally logical to find that the state merely set
a minimum standard, leaving the city to restrict the hours further if it
felt it necessary. For example, in the Gozion case,4" why not say that
the state merely established 500 feet as a minimum standard, allowing
the city to be more restrictive if they so desire? Such an approach has
been taken in other jurisdictions.
For example, the constitution of Idaho provides that:
Any county or incorporated city or town may make and enforce within its limits, all such local police, sanitary and other41regulations as are
not in conflict with its charter or with general laws.
The courts of that state have held that municipal ordinances which merely
add a further or additional regulation to the one imposed by the state are
In fact, in a case almost identical with the Neil House
not in conflict.'
case," the court held that where the only difference between the ordinance and the statute was that the ordinance went further in its prohibi44
tion, there was no conflict.
Similarily, the constitution of California provides that:
Any county, city, town or township may make and enforce within its
limits all such local police, sanitary and other regulations as are not in
conflict with general laws. 45
It should be noted that California has removed liquor from local control
by a specific constitutional provision.4 6 However, their approach to the
matter of conflict between general laws and local ordinances on other
subjects affords a valid comparison. The municipalities have been allowed to legislate without being guilty of conflict where the local regulaThe courts have recognized that local
tion has been more restrictive'
39. 108 Ohio St. 263, 140 N.E. 519 (1923).
40. Civil No. 717, 374, C.P., Cuyahoga County, Ohio, Feb. 20, 1959.
41. IDAHO CoNsr. art. 12, § 2.
42. State v. Brunello, 67 Idaho 242, 176 P.2d 212 (1946); State v. Musser, 67 Idaho 214,
176 P.2d 199 (1946).
43. 144 Ohio St. 248, 58 N.E.2d 665 (1944).
44. In Clyde Hess Distributing Co. v. Bonneville County, 69 Idaho 505, 210 P.2d 798
(1949), the city said no beer could be sold from midnight Saturday until Monday morning.
The state had prohibited sale only from 1 a. m. to 7 a. m. Sunday. The court held that there
was no conflict between the ordinance and the statute.
45. CAL. CONST. art. XI, § 11.
46. CAL. CONST. art. XX, § 22.
47. Natural Milk Producers Ass'n of Cal. v. San Francisco, 20 Cal. 2d 101, 124 P.2d 25
(1942), rev'd on other grounds, 317 U.S. 423 (1943); In re Iverson, 199 Cal. 582, 250 Pac.
681 (1926); In re Hoffman, 155 Cal. 114, 99 Pac. 517 (1909).
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conditions may require more stringent regulations than the state has imposed.4"
These views are, of course, not binding on Ohio courts. However,
they serve to point out another and at least equally logical approach to
what is substantially the same problem. If home rule is to have substance in Ohio, the idea of negative implication must be abolished. Prior
to the Neil House case,49 it appeared that the holding in the Sokol case"
and Akron v. Scalera5' was sufficient to reject that doctrine. That was
evidently an illusory hope for home rule proponents. Since the Neil
House decision, the courts have followed the negative implication doctrine in situations involving liquor.52 The Neil House case apparently
stands as the law of Ohio today despite a recent trend by the Ohio
Supreme Court toward liberality in regard to home rule." If Ohio municipalities are to achieve any appreciable amount of control over the liquor
industry within their limits, they must overcome this case. Whether
they can accomplish this is natually a matter of conjecture. However,
54 offers encouragement.
the recent case of State ex rel. Canada v. Phillips
In that case, the city of Columbus was permitted to make a civil
service appointment in a manner different from that which the state
statute prescribed. Caution should be exercised in attempting to apply
this holding to municipal police regulations controlling traffic in or consumption of intoxicating liquor. It may well be that the decision will be
limited to the administration of police and fire departments and will not
be extended to police regulations relating to liquor control. The court
did state that it considered:
The authority of the General Assembly to enact laws pursuant to section 10 of article XV of the Ohio constitution, to be an authority to enact such laws to be applicable in cities only where and to the extent that
such laws will not restrict the exercise by such cities of their powers of
self-government. 55
Such a statement clearly shows a sentiment by the court to give more life
48. Natural Milk Producers Ass'n of Cal. v. San Francisco, 20 Cal. 2d 101, 124 P.2d 25
(1942), rev'd on other grounds, 317 U.S. 423 (1943).
49. 144 Ohio St. 248, 58 N.E.2d 665 (1944).
50. 108 Ohio St. 263, 140 N.E. 519 (1923).
51. 135 Ohio St. 65, 19 N.E.2d 279 (1939). The court would not accept the idea that the
city was limited to what the state expressly allowed it to do. The defendant had made the
argument that since the statute was silent upon the subject of beer (as distinguished from
intoxicating liquor) sales on Sunday, the implication was that it could be sold. This argument
was rejected and the municipal ordinance regulating the sale of beer was upheld. Contra,
Neil House Hotel Co. v. City of Columbus, 144 Ohio St. 248, 58 N.E.2d 665 (1944).
52. Kaufman v. Village of Paulding, 92 Ohio App. 169, 109 N.E.2d 531 (1951); Williams
v. Jackson, 164 N.E.2d 195 (Ohio C.P. 1959).
53. Blume, Municipal Home Rule in Ohio: The New Look, 11 WEST. REs. L. Rsv. 538,
545 (1960).
54. 168 Ohio St. 191, 151 N.E.2d 722 (1958).
55. Id. at 195, 151 N.E.2d at 726.
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to home rule. However, the court could well be indined to distinguish a
case involving an ordinance establishing earlier dosing hours for bars on
the grounds that civil service appointments are simply not comparable
to such police regulations. But the language of the court indicates that
it may be prepared to extend its more liberal outlook. Judge Taft said:
It is undoubtedly true that the enforcement of laws in every part of
the state is a matter of "statewide concern' ... [But] the mere interest
or concern of the state in providing similar police protection, will not
justify the state's interference with such exercise by a municipality of
its powers of local self-government.5 6
It should be noted that the court is speaking of matters of local selfgovernment and not of police regulations. That police regulations are
still limited by the non-conflict provision seems dear. And it is equally
dear that there is still a problem of deliniating matters of local selfgovernment from police regulations. A careful reading of the case indicates that as a weapon for reducing the scope of the Neil House case,
it will be primarily of value to show a general "new look" in the Ohio
Supreme Court's approach to home rule. The stumbling block of negative implication must still be removed.
A very recent case has thrown yet another such impediment in the
path of the cities. In City of Lyndhurst v. Compola5 the court of appeals flatly stated that the regulation of the manufacture and sale of
liquor in Ohio has been completely preempted by the state. If this statement is upheld by the Ohio Supreme Court, the controversy over negative
implication will become a moot point. It should be noted that the zoning ordinance in this case was such that the permit holder simply could
not use his permit anywhere in the city. The result, of course, was to
enable the city to veto actions by the State Board of Liquor Control. This
would be a conflict even under the Sokol case5 ' since the ordinance would
prohibit that which the state permits. It is to be hoped that if the case
is appealed, the Ohio Supreme Court will limit it to its facts. If the
statement that the state has preempted the field is allowed to stand, it
will be the final blow to any meaningful control over liquor by municipalities.
LOCAL OPTION

If municipalities cannot force liquor establishments to dose at certain
hours" and cannot prohibit them from being located within certain
56.
57.
58.
59.

Id. at 200, 151 N.E.2d at 729.
169 N.E.2d 558 (Ohio Ct.App. 1960).
108 Ohio St. 263, 140 N.E. 519 (1923).
Neil House Hotel Co. v. City of Columbus, 144 Ohio St. 248, 58 N.E.2d 665 (1944)
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distances of churches, schools, etc.6" and cannot prohibit the sale of "3.2
beer" on Sunday,"' what can they do about intoxicating liquor? The
answer is that they can vote the business right out of existence. The
Revised Code grants the privilege of local option to municipal corporations, to residence districts within a municipal corporation consisting of
two or more contiguous election precincts and to townships. 2
This course of action has obvious drawbacks. It is costly and cumbersome. It also has the practical disadvantage that the people of a community may very well be unwilling to eliminate liquor entirely whereas
they may desire to limit the time and place of its consumption and sale.
Under the local option provision, they are not permitted to express their
views on this but are faced with almost an "all or nothing" type of proposition.'
Despite these deficiencies, local option remains as a measure
which can and has been used to control intoxicating liquor.6" If the present record of frustration of municipal desires is continued, 5 we may
expect to see more of this in subsequent local elections.
CONCLUSION

Ohio municipalities have ostensibly had home rule since 1912. The
path to full realization of the purposes of home rule has been twisting
and arduous and at times an "unhappy business."6 And in no area has
it been more frustrating to the cities than in liquor control. The municipalities have only three avenues open to them to control intoxicating
liquor within their limits. They can proceed under their police power
as granted them by the Ohio constitution. 7 In this, they have been
notably unsuccessful, due mainly to the doctrine of negative implication.
Failing in that, they can attempt to influence the legislature and thereby
the Board of Liquor Control, to enact legislation and regulations to suit
60. Gozion v. City of Lakewood, Civil No. 717, 374, C.P., Cuyahoga County, Ohio, Feb. 20,
1959.
61. Williams v. City of Jackson, 164 N.E.2d 195 (Ohio C.P. 1959).
62. OHIO REv. CODE § 4301.32. Such provisions have been held constitutional as long as
all parts of the state have equal opportunity to take advantage of them.
63. The electors can eliminate certain types of permits while retaining others. OHIO REv.
CODE § 4301.36, .38.
64. In the recent elections, four areas in the Akron vicinity balloted on local option and all
went "dry." Akron Beacon Journal, Nov. 10, 1960, p. 28, col. 3.
65. There has been an increasing amount of newspaper agitation in recent months over the
liquor situation. The principal complaint has been that the State Board of Liquor Control is
virtually ignoring local zoning boards. Akron Beacon Journal, Dec. 5, 1960, p. 25, col. 7;
Cleveland Press, Dec. 1, 1960, p. 14, col. 1. However, it is not always the Board of Liquor
Control which thwarts local desires. Apparently, it is often the Franklin County court, in
overruling the Board of Liquor Control, which does so. Cleveland Press, Nov. 22, 1960, p.
14, col. 1.
66. Fordham and Asher, Home Rule Powers in Theory and Practice, 9 OHIO ST. U.J. 18
(1948).
67. OHIO CONST. art. XVIII, § 3.

